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• The inﬂation-target horizon is the period
during which monetary policy actions are
expected to return inﬂation to target.
Policy-makers have an interest in
communicating this horizon, since it is
likely to help anchor inﬂation expectations.
• Bank researchers have recently conducted
two studies of the appropriate horizon for
returning inﬂation to target. The choice of
the inﬂation-target horizon balances the
costs of volatility associated with the output
gap and interest rates against the beneﬁts
of keeping inﬂation close to its target.
• Research results indicate that the duration
of the optimal inﬂation-target horizon varies
widely, depending on the combination of
shocks to the economy. On average,
however, it is marginally shorter than eight
quarters. Bearing in mind the inherent
uncertainty in this type of analysis, the
current target horizon of six to eight
quarters appears to remain an appropriate
guide to the speed with which inﬂation
should return to target in response to
economic shocks.
• In rare cases when the ﬁnancial accelerator
is triggered by a persistent shock such as an
asset-price bubble, it may be appropriate to
take a longer view of the inﬂation-target
horizon.
he inﬂation-target horizon is the time it takes
inflation to return to target in response to
monetarypolicyactionsdesignedtooffsetthe
effects of a shock on the economy. Inﬂation
does not immediately return to target because frictions
(for example, wage contracts) in the economy cause
movements in inﬂation to persist, and because there
are lags in the effect of a monetary policy action on
inflation.
The inﬂation-target horizon is the
time it takes inﬂation to return to
target.
A short horizon would be consistent with a vigorous
change in interest rates in order to return inﬂation to
target quickly, but could result in excessive volatility
in interest rates and the real economy, since the lagged
effects of vigorous interest rate changes need to be
cancelled by subsequent actions in the other direction.
A long horizon would be consistent with a more slug-
gish change in interest rates that could result in less real
volatility, but would cause deviations of inflation from
target to be more persistent. Thus, there is an optimal
inflation-targethorizonthatbalancesthesetwoopposing
considerations. Moreover, each type of shock to the
economy will have its own optimal inflation-target
horizon because each shock leads to a different trade-
off between output and inflation volatility. The target
horizon as discussed by the Bank of Canada refers to
the typical length of time required to return inflation
to target in response to various combinations of shocks.
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This article draws on two Bank of Canada studies that
subject a pair of state-of-the-art dynamic stochastic
general-equilibrium models of the Canadian economy
to an array of shocks that mimic the typical shocks
experienced over the past 25 years. Both models con-
tain well-articulated explanations of the monetary
policy transmission mechanism. In one study, the
model focuses on nominal and real frictions (e.g.,
nominal wage contracts, costs of adjusting capital) to
explain the lag between a monetary policy action and
the subsequent movement of inflation. The model in
the other study additionally incorporates financial
frictions (often referred to as financial accelerators)
that, when triggered, can change the relationship
between a monetary policy action and the subsequent
movement of inﬂation.
Inﬂation does not immediately return
to target because of frictions in the
economy.
To determine the optimal inﬂation-target horizon, a
quantitative measure of the loss the economy suffers
from volatility in output, inflation, or interest rates
from following a monetary policy rule that returns
inflation to target either too quickly or too slowly is
included in the models. The parameters of the monetary
policy rules in the models—which relate changes in
the policy interest rate to predicted future deviations
of inflation from target and the current state of the
output gap—are then varied to determine the inflation-
target horizon that minimizes the loss to the economy.1
This exercise is repeated for a wide array of potential
shocks in order to obtain the range of optimal inﬂa-
tion-target horizons.
The results from these studies support the thesis that
different shocks are associated with different horizons,
indicating that the optimal inflation-target horizon
varies over time, just as shocks hitting the economy
vary. Nevertheless, in most instances, the studies
support the conclusion that the Bank’s policy since
1991, which has aimed to return inflation to target
within a six-to-eight-quarter target horizon, remains
1.   See Armour and Côté (1999–2000) and Black, Macklem, and Rose (1997)
for a review of feedback rules for inﬂation control.
appropriate. In rare cases when the financial accel-
erator is triggered by a large and persistent shock, it
may be appropriate to take a longer view of the inﬂa-
tion-target horizon.
Methodology
Because of the complexity of the frictions present in the
economy, the two studies examined the issue of the
inflation-target horizon through the lens of two dif-
ferent models of the Canadian economy.
The ﬁrst study, by Cayen, Corbett, and Perrier (2006,
henceforth CCP), uses a preliminary version of the
Terms-of-Trade Economic Model (TOTEM), a new
multi-sector, open-economy dynamic general-equilib-
rium model of the Canadian economy designed to
analyzemonetarypolicyissuesandtoconducteconomic
projections (Murchison and Rennison, forthcoming).
Nominal-wage rigidity is the most important friction
used in TOTEM to generate persistent real short-run
effects of monetary policy actions. Signiﬁcant, but less
important, are price rigidities. Also important are
habit formation,2 costly adjustment of physical capital,
and variable capital utilization. In addition, TOTEM
features a separate commodity-production sector that
permits rich terms-of-trade dynamics and uses a wide
range of exogenous shocks to provide the initial
impulses for the model’s dynamics.
The second study, by Basant-Roi and Mendes (2006,
henceforth BRM), uses an experimental model that
features a financial accelerator in the housing market.3
This model shares many of the features of TOTEM,
including nominal-wage rigidities in both the labour
and product markets and real rigidities, such as habit
formation, that slow the speed of the real economy’s
adjustment to shocks. Although the model used in BRM
is not as well developed in certain areas as TOTEM, it
features ﬁnancialfrictions not incorporated inTOTEM
and can therefore provide insight into how the interac-
tion between the real economy and the financial sector
might affect economic outcomes.4 The financial fric-
tions in the model result from variations in the value
2.   Habit formation refers to the assumption that consumers care not only
about their level of consumption but about the change in consumption from
one period to the next.
3. The current version of this model does not account for a ﬁnancial accelera-
tor that may also exist in the business sector and affect business investment
through, say, large swings in equity prices. However, given the structure of
the Canadian economy, large swings in housing prices are likely to be of more
concern to policy-makers (Selody and Wilkins 2004).
4.   For example, BRM does not allow for commodity-price shocks or shocks
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of collateral used to secure mortgage financing. For
example, in the face of a positive shock to housing
prices, the initial increase in the price of houses raises
the value of mortgage collateral, which reduces the
cost of borrowing. This stimulates borrowing and
aggregate demand, including housing demand, and
sets off a financial accelerator by causing a further
increase in housing prices. The financial accelerator
is set off by shocks that are quite similar to those in
TOTEM; in addition, the inclusion of housing prices in
the model provides an opportunity to study the effect
of asset-price bubbles on the optimal inﬂation-target
horizon.
Both models were assigned parameters to replicate
key characteristics of the Canadian macroeconomic
data over the period 1980 to 2004. Matching the key
relationships found in the data is essential to correctly
characterizingtheinherenttrade-offsbetweeninflation,
the output gap, and interest rate stabilization that are
a feature of the economy.
Well-anchored expectations create a
strongtendencyforactualinﬂationto
revert to the inﬂation target.
One of the key determinants of the persistence of
inﬂation in the economy is the credibility of monetary
policy. If policy is highly credible, inflation expectations
will remain well anchored to the inﬂation target over
the medium term. For the purpose of this article, both
models assume that monetary policy is highly credible,
which is consistent with recent evidence (see box).
Monetary Policy Credibility
There is considerable evidence that the credibility of
monetary policy has increased signiﬁcantly with the
introductionoftheinflation-targetingregimeinCanada.
Chart B1 shows several measures of inﬂation expecta-
tions at various horizons. For example, the difference
between the yield on Government of Canada long-term
Real Return Bonds and nominal bonds of comparable
maturity (labelled the Break-Even Inflation Rate, BEIR),
may be considered a very crude proxy for long-term
inﬂation expectations. (For a thorough discussion of
the usefulness of the BEIR as an indicator of inﬂation
expectations, see Christensen, Dion, and Reid 2004).
The evolution of bond-yield differentials suggests
that there has been a decline in the premium for inﬂa-
tion expectations. Longer-term inflation forecasts
reported by Consensus Economics surveys of private
sector forecasters show a similar convergent trend.
These  forecasts suggest that longer-term inflation
expectations (two, five, and 10 years ahead) converged
on the 2 per cent inﬂation target after its introduction
and have remained in line with the target since then.
Johnson(1998),Perrier(1998),andAmanoandPerrier
(2000) use statistical analysis based on the survey data
to conclude that the credibility of monetary policy in
Canada has increased over the inﬂation-targeting
period.
Drawing inferences about monetary policy credibility
from surveys of expected inﬂation is hindered by the
possibility that expectations of inﬂation may be low
simply because of recent business-cycle developments,
including past inflation itself. A more compelling
analysis can be found in Levin, Natalucci, and Piger
(2004), who ﬁnd that, for the period 1994 to 2003, pri-
vate sector long-run inﬂation forecasts fail to exhibit
significant correlation with lagged inflation for the
five countries (including Canada) that maintained
explicit inflation objectives over this period, indicating
that the monetary policy followed by these central
banks has been reasonably credible.
Chart B1
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function imply that the central bank cares equally about
inﬂation and the output gap but less about smoothing
interest rate movements.7
Both studies also characterize the behaviour of the
central bank through the use of a simple monetary
policy rule:
, (2)
where R* is where interest rates eventually settle and
Et denotes expectations made in period t.8 A simple
rule was used because it is more likely to be robust
across models than a more complex rule optimized for
a particular model (Levin, Wieland, and Williams 1999;
Armour and Côté 1999–2000; and Côté et al. 2002). The
specific rule used here is an inﬂation-forecast-based
(IFB) rule in that the inflation term uses the difference
between the expected future inflation rate and the target.
In general, IFB rules are simple, intuitive, and parsi-
monious, and have reasonable properties over a wide
range of disturbances (see Amano, Coletti, and
Macklem 1999; and Black, Macklem, and Rose 1997).
The variables in this hypothetical monetary policy
reaction function are the same as those in the objective
function.Thecentralbankchoosestheweightoninterest
rate smoothing ( ), the degree to which it reacts to
expected deviations of inﬂation from target ( ), the
degree to which it reacts to the output gap ( ), and
the degree to which policy is forward looking (k).
These parameters are chosen separately for each of the
models in the CPP and BRM studies to minimize the
objective function (1) when the economy is subject to
an array of random shocks similar to those seen over
history. The resulting inflation-target horizon is deemed
to be an optimal horizon, at least within the conﬁnes
of a simple feedback rule.
Results from Shocks Occurring in
Normal Times
Table 1 quantifies the inflation-target horizon associated
with the optimal rule if we again faced the typical
macroeconomic shocks observed over the 1980 to 2004
7. Some recent research focuses on choosing monetary policy rules that max-
imize the welfare of the representative consumer. One advantage of this strat-
egy is that it avoids specifying arbitrary central bank loss functions, as is done
in the work discussed here. Since this new approach is computationally quite
demanding, it remains challenging in more realistic larger-scale models.
8. The complexity of monetary policy decision making means that these sim-
ple reaction functions should not be thought of as precise characterizations of
the behaviour of policy-makers.
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Well-anchored expectations create a strong tendency
for actual inﬂation to revert to the inﬂation target and,
all else being equal, indicate that monetary policy
needs to be less active (Svensson 2002) and that interest
rates and output need to move less to counter move-
ments in inﬂation away from target.
The CCP and BRM studies apply the same general
methodology to determine the optimal target horizon
(seeBatiniandNelson2000).Inbothstudies,thecentral
bank is assumed to adjust policy interest rates to mini-
mize the overall costs arising from three sources: inﬂa-
tion volatility around the target inﬂation rate, output
volatility around potential output (the output gap),
and the volatility of interest rates. Stabilizing inﬂation
is desirable in part because variable inﬂation makes it
harder for the market to achieve efficient resource
allocation, and the ensuing uncertainty makes it more
difﬁcult for ﬁrms, consumers, and savers to make the
right decisions (Svensson 2002).  Minimizing output
variability around potential is an objective because
households generally prefer a smooth future consump-
tion stream. The volatility of interest rates is included
because policy-makers are assumed to care about
financial stability, which might be impacted by excessive
volatility in interest rates (Cukierman 1990), or about
the risk of hitting the zero bound on nominal interest
rates (Rotemberg and Woodford 1997; Woodford 1999).
More formally, the models used in the two studies
incorporate the assumption that the central bank sets
the optimal inﬂation-target horizon to minimize the
quadratic loss function:
 , (1)
where , , and are the unconditional vari-
ances of the gap between inﬂation ( ) and the target
inﬂation rate ( ), the output gap (ygap), and the
change in the policy interest rate ( ).5
The function captures the notion that all future devia-
tions of these variables from target are costly to the
economy.6 The weights on the various elements in the
5.  The intertemporal loss function is: , where Et
denotes expectations based on information that is available in time t, and
is the rate at which central banks discount the future. As the discount rate
approaches one Lim . Tables 1 and 2 provide estimates of the vari-
ances of inﬂation, the output gap, and the change in interest rates under the
optimized monetary policy rules.
6. Note that the deviations are represented quadratically, indicating that sub-
stantial deviations from the targets are thus assessed as considerably more
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period.9  For these calculations it is deemed that inﬂa-
tion has returned to target if it is within 0.1 percentage
point of the target. The average target horizon is the
mean of the distribution built from making repeated
draws from the distribution of shocks that were esti-
mated to have hit the economy over that period.
There are three main points to be drawn from the
table. First, the CCP and BRM studies ﬁnd a similar
meaninflation-targethorizonof6to7quarters.Second,
the range of target horizons is also quite similar in the
two studies. The CCP study estimates that, in the event
of a shock that pushes inﬂation away from the target,
it should be returned to within 0.1 percentage point of
the target within 4 to 11 quarters 90 per cent of the time.
The BRM study ﬁnds a similar range of 2 to 9 quarters.
Third, these results suggest that the optimal inﬂation-
target horizon is, on average, at the lower end of the
6-to-8-quarter range. This may reflect, in part, increased
credibility since the targeting regime was introduced,
which has acted to reduce the lag between monetary
policy actions and inﬂation outcomes and has thereby
reduced the cost of returning inﬂation to target.
Results Including Housing-Price
Bubbles
BRM also simulated an exogenous asset-price bubble
in the housing market to see what effect it might have
9.   The horizon is somewhat sensitive to different sample periods, with the
horizon varying as much as two quarters in the samples considered in the
CCP study. While a variation of two quarters is enough to push the average
inflation horizon outside the six-to-eight-quarter range in some circumstances,
the deviation is not large enough to signiﬁcantly affect expectations. In the
CCP study, there are ﬁve demand shocks (e.g., consumption shock), six price
or mark-up shocks (e.g., wage shock), a domestic technology shock, a shock
to the country risk premium, and four foreign shocks (world commodity
prices, foreign output, foreign prices, and the foreign interest rate).
Feedback horizon (k) 2.0 2.0
Smoothing parameter (r) 0.8 0.6
Inﬂation variance 0.9 0.7
Output gap variance 5.1 4.3
Variance of the change in interest rate 1.7 1.6
Mean target horizon 7.0 6.0








Optimal Target Horizons in the
Absence of Housing-Price Bubbles
CCP BRM
Note: Horizons are expressed as the number of quarters required to return
inﬂation to within 0.1 percentage point of the target.
* Based on a 90 per cent conﬁdence band
on the optimal inflation-target horizon. The bubble,
which is defined as a sustained and growing gap
between the market price of a house and its funda-
mental economic value, is modelled along the lines
of Bernanke and Gertler (2000). In this exercise, it is
assumed that the probabilities of the bubble arising
and bursting are fixed and are known to all of the
agents in the model.10 Bubbles are assumed to arise,
on average, every 10 years. The probabilities are calcu-
lated such that, on average, the bubble grows to a
maximum of 30 per cent of fundamental value, and
the bubble-boom period spans a maximum of three
years.11 These simulations are conducted using the
same policy rule as in the no-bubble case considered
above (Rule 1), along with another rule that is optimized
given the possibility of bubbles (Rule 2).
Introducing the possibility of bubbles has little effect
on the parameters of the optimized simple feedback
rule from the BRM study reported in Table 1, since
asset-price bubbles are assumed to be low-probability
events. In the event that a housing-price bubble actually
hits the economy, the average time it takes for inflation
to return to target lengthens significantly (Table 2).
The horizon is substantially longer because such a
shock triggers large financial-accelerator effects, which
are very costly for monetary policy to counteract. In
particular, a housing-price bubble has a direct effect
on asset prices and the financial accelerator, whereas
all of the other shocks have only an indirect effect.
10.  This assumption is made for simplicity, since, in reality, agents do not
have this much information.
11.  This is roughly consistent with stylized facts for housing-price bubbles
found in the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook for
April 2003.
Feedback horizon (k) 2.0 2.0
Smoothing parameter (r) 0.6 0.6
Inﬂation variance 0.8 0.8
Output gap variance 4.3 4.4
Variance of the change in interest rate 1.6 1.6
Mean target horizon 14.0 13.0








Optimal Target Horizons in the
Case of Housing-Price Bubbles
Rule 1: Rule 2:
ignoring optimized
bubbles with bubbles
Note: Horizons are expressed as the number of quarters required to return
inﬂation to within 0.1 percentage point of the target.
* Based on a 90 per cent conﬁdence band36 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2006
This result occurs whether or not housing prices are
specifically added to the monetary policy rule.  Sen-
sitivity analysis shows that there is little to be gained
by including housing prices directly in the rule, likely
because it already considers their effects on inﬂation
and output volatility. This result is consistent with
Bernanke and Gertler's (2000) ﬁnding that monetary
policycandealappropriatelywithbubblesbyreacting
to expected inﬂation. Policy does not have to respond
directly to housing prices to be effective.12
The results are therefore no more than
an indication of what might happen if
the Canadian economy were to
experience an asset-price bubble.
The simulations in BRM are highly stylized, and the
results are therefore no more than an indication of
what might happen if the Canadian economy were to
experience an asset-price bubble. It is difﬁcult to be
precise about the real impact of large housing-price
shocks, the effect of monetary policy actions on a
housing-price bubble, and the degree to which the target
horizon may need to be extended, given how rarely
these situations have occurred in Canada in the past.13
Moreover, the model does not account for the full
extent of financial disruption that may accompany
such events. For example, while the cost of mortgage
ﬁnancing increases in response to falling asset prices,
quantity restrictions that may occur in the event of a
“credit crunch” are not modelled. Tkacz and Wilkins
(2006) find evidence in the Canadian data of important
12.  For a more recent example, see Tetlow (2005).
13.  In the BRM experiments, monetary policy actions affect the fundamental
component of housing prices, but not the bubble process.
threshold effects in the relationship between housing
prices and real activity, suggesting that the bias from
ignoring such quantity restrictions may be important.
A target horizon of six to eight
quarters remains appropriate.
Conclusions
The choice of the inflation-target horizon is a balancing
act. A shorter horizon keeps inflation closer to the target
but at the cost of more volatility in output and interest
rates; a longer horizon allows the central bank to miss
its inﬂation target for a longer period in the interest of
greater stability in output and interest rates. Our studies
show that the optimal inﬂation-target horizon varies
with each shock and suggest that, on average, the
optimal horizon is marginally shorter than previously
thought. However, because of several important
sources of uncertainty inherent in the analysis, the
point estimates of the optimal inﬂation-target horizon
should be interpreted as merely indicative. In particular,
the structure and calibration of the models studied are
imperfect approximations of the actual economy. As
well, the pattern of future shocks could be quite differ-
ent from historical experience. Finally, these studies
rely on concepts that are not easy to put into practice
with great precision. For example, it is difficult to
accurately specify the preferences of policy-makers
using a simple objective function. In light of this
uncertainty, we conclude that a target horizon of six
to eight quarters remains appropriate in most instances.
In the context of the models examined, a few rare
shocks, such as an asset-price bubble, have unusually
long inﬂation-target horizons. In these rare circum-
stances, the results suggest that it may therefore be
appropriate for monetary policy to take a longer view
of the inﬂation-target horizon.37 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2006
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